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ABSTRACT
Scholars and policy-makers have long debated over the causes of the spectacular
economic success achieved by the East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) as
well as over the lessons that other developing countries can learn from this
development experience. Latin America started to industrialize many decades before
the East Asian NICs and yet was quickly overtaken by them in the last few decades.
This essay seeks to explore the agrarian roots which may explain the different
development trajectory and performance between the East Asian NICs, particularly
South Korea and Taiwan, and Latin America. The analysis focuses mainly on three
interconnected factors in seeking to understand why the East Asian NICs outperformed
Latin America: (1) State capacity and policy performance or 'statecraft', (2) character of
agrarian reform and its impact on equity and growth, and (3) interactions between
agriculture and industry in development strategies.3
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The impressive economic success achieved by the East Asian newly
industrializing countries (NICs), Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong-Kong,
since the 1960s has led scholars and policy makers to look more closely at this
development experience to discover if any useful lessons could be learned by other
developing countries and Latin America in particular (Naya, Mark and Fuentes, 1989).
While some authors have argued that there are no or few lessons to be learned as this
success story cannot be generalized (Cline, 1982) others, in particular the World Bank
and neoliberal economists, have argued that the main lesson to be learned from the East
Asian NICs is that free markets, free trade and an export-oriented development strategy
are the key to economic success (Krueger, 1985; Balassa, 1988; Harberger, 1988). Thus
countries which had pursued protectionism and import-substitution-industrialization
(ISI) policies came in for heavy criticisms by the World Bank and advocates of
neoliberal economic policies (Krueger, 1978; Balassa, 1982; Lal, 1983; Corbo et al.,
1985). This has generated much debate and the neoliberal interpretation of the NICs'
economic success has been challenged and shown to be flawed (Toye, 1987; Luedde-
Neurath, 1988; Bielefeld, 1988; Gereffi, 1989; Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1994).
It is now generally accepted that the success of the NICs was largely due to the
crucial role played by the State which also involved at times selective protectionist
policies (Wade, 1988; Gore, 1996). Even the World Bank (1993) has come to admit,
though reluctantly, that the State was heavily involved in the NICs development
process. Nevertheless, it still argues against a developmentalist State and for a
minimalist role of the State in economic affairs. Many developing countries influenced
by the experience of the NICs have attempted to emulate their dramatic industrial
export performance with varying degrees of success. While more balanced
commentators are aware that the inward directed development process of those
countries which had followed ISI policies in the postwar period was not the disaster
story which it had been made out to be, and, on the contrary, was in some instances
even more successful than the record of some countries which had followed neoliberal
policies, they are now more aware of the limitations of ISI and of the development
opportunities which a greater integration into world markets can offer. This can be
exemplified by the evolution of structuralist development thinkers and institutions like
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean2
(ECLAC) who have shifted to a neostructuralist position by taking on board the merits
of certain neoliberal policies and recognizing some of the advantages which greater
integration into world markets can provide (Kay and Gwynne, 2000). In the past few
decades a second generation of NICs have emerged, particularly in Asia, such as
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China, which were specially keen to promote
industrial exports. In Latin America countries which already had gone through an ISI
process were now eager to move into industrial exports, especially Mexico and Brazil.
Mexico even joined the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) in 1992
thereby integrating more closely its economy with that of the USA and Canada.
Much of the focus by analysts interested to learn from the NICs' experience has
been on industrial and trade policy and less so on agricultural policy. Most studies refer
to a particular country or region and few have a comparative focus across regions. In
this essay I seek to explore the relationship between the agricultural and industrial
sectors, and especially agriculture's contribution to industrialization by comparing some
Asian and Latin American countries. Furthermore, to what extent are differences in
agrarian structure, landlord-peasant relations, and state policy significant factors in
explaining variations in the development performance between the two regions? In
particular I am interested to examine to what extent agrarian reforms have made a
difference to their economic and social development. For the Asian region I have
selected South Korea and Taiwan as they have undertaken extensive agrarian reforms
and have been among the most economically successful Asian countries. For Latin
America I am drawing on the experience of a greater number of countries
distinguishing between those which had only marginal land reforms from those which
undertook radical land reforms. My aim in this comparative exercise is to achieve a
greater understanding of the reasons why the Asian NICs succeeded in outperforming
so dramatically Latin America, which once was at the forefront of the developing
world, and by implication draw some lessons for Latin America from the East Asian
NICs but being fully aware of the different historical circumstances.
Many analysts consider the nature of the inter-sectoral relationship between
agriculture and industry as being of prime importance for explaining differences in the
development performance between countries (Mellor, 1973; Bhaduri and Skarstein,
1997). Although the debate on whether agricultural development is a prior requisite for
industrialization or whether both can be concurrent processes is still unresolved few3
specialists question that the performance of the agricultural sector will have a major
bearing on a country's industrialization (Jones and Woolf, 1969; Johnston and Kilby,
1975). To achieve a successful industrialization a country will have to resolve the
problems associated with the generation, transfer and use of an agricultural surplus
(Mundle, 1985). This is particularly important in the initial stages of industrial
development. A brief elucidation of the meaning of agricultural surplus might be in
order. There a various meanings given to this term and various ways of measuring it
which does not need to concern us unduly in a paper of this kind. A common and
simple meaning of agricultural surplus refers to the total value of agricultural
production minus what the agricultural sector retains for its own consumption and
reproduction. It thus refers to that part of agricultural output which is not retained by
the sector itself and which is transferred to other economic sectors through a variety of
means. This can be defined as the gross agricultural surplus. The net agricultural
surplus is equal to the above less what the agricultural sector purchases from other
sectors, such as industrial consumer and investment goods as well as services. It is thus
the amount of resources available to finance investment in the non-agricultural sector.
This net agricultural surplus is particularly important during the initial stages of
industrialization. Once an industrial sector has established itself it can generate the
necessary surplus for investment from within the sector and the need to extract an
agricultural surplus becomes less urgent. At later stages of economic development the
flow is often in the opposite direction, i.e. an industrial surplus helping to finance
agriculture. For a detailed analysis of the various types and ways to define and calculate
an agricultural surplus, see Morrison and Thorbecke (1990), and Winters et al. (1998).
There are various ways in which an agricultural surplus can be transferred to
other economic sectors. An agricultural surplus can be transferred voluntarily or in a
compulsory way. A voluntary transfer happens when, for example, farmers put their
savings in a bank which then can lend the money to an industrialist, or when landlords
invest directly in a non-agricultural venture such as an agro-industrial processing plant
or a textile mill. A compulsory transfer occurs, when, for example, the government
taxes farmers' incomes or introduces obligatory purchase of crops by a state marketing
board at a price below the international border price. Voluntary transfers of the
agricultural surplus can be considered as being market-induced as, for example, when
the rate of return is considered higher by landlords outside agriculture they will invest4
part or all of their profits or rent in the more profitable sector. Compulsory transfers are
policy-induced as they arise through government  intervention  as,  for  example, 
taxation or an overvalued exchange rate (Teranishi, 1997).
A distinction can also be made between visible or 'on the table' and invisible or
'under the table' surplus transfer (Gereffi, 1990). A resource transfer is visible, as with
direct taxation and government expenditure, or invisible, as with inflation, and the
government's manipulation of the terms of trade between agricultural and industrial
commodities by, for example, fixing agricultural prices below their free market value,
or by manipulating the foreign exchange rate against agriculture. The differences
between visible and invisible transfers are expressed clearly by Winters et al. (1998:
72) who also make a distinction between direct and indirect invisible transfers: 'Visible
transfers include taxes, payments of rents to urban landlords, voluntary transfers from
agricultural to non-agricultural households, savings of agriculture invested in non-
agriculture, and net transfer of the balance of current accounts of agriculture. Invisible
transfers occur through the terms of trade for agriculture. ... Direct invisible transfers
can also occur through government intervention using price controls, export taxes, and
import subsidies. Indirect invisible transfers occur through overvalued or appreciated
real exchange rates which depress the domestic price of tradable agricultural goods.'
These distinctions between various mechanisms for transferring an agricultural
surplus are made not only to illustrate the great variety of resource transfers which exist
but also because some mechanisms are considered to be more appropriate or more
efficient in achieving certain developmental goals as compared to others. For example,
if too high a surplus is extracted from agriculture to finance industry this can either
depress living standards beyond reasonable levels, leading to social unrest in the
countryside, or result in a fall in agricultural investment, leading to lower rates of
agricultural growth and food shortages, or it can provoke both effects. The various
devices of surplus transfer have different impacts on the behaviour of actors and thus
create different economic, social and political outcomes. For example, it is likely that
farmers will resist more fiercely price controls over foodstuffs than an overvalued
exchange rate as the former is a more visible policy instrument as compared to the
latter. Some ways of extracting a surplus from the agricultural sector might be easier for
governments than others. In a country with a dispersed rural population and poor land
property records it might be difficult to collect a land tax and an easier mechanism5
might to impose a tax on agricultural exports. Also, some authors like Ranis (1990)
consider that policies designed to achieve a sectoral resource transfer which are explicit,
debated and negotiated are preferable to those which are implicit, clandestine and
imposed. The relevance of these distinctions will emerge in the subsequent analysis of
the particular case studies discussed in this essay.
The analysis should not be confined to the concept of agricultural surplus and
the various transfer mechanisms. Within a more general and dynamic context of a
development process it is also useful to discuss the various contributions that
agriculture can make to economic growth and industrialization in particular. First, it can
provide factors of production such as labour, capital and entrepreneurs (landlords or
capitalist farmers who become industrialists, merchants, etc.). Second, it can also make
a market contribution in the sense of, on the one hand, supplying agricultural
commodities and, on the other hand, providing a domestic market for industrial
commodities (Mellor, 1998). As for the first contribution regarding factors of
production. An abundant supply of labour will help to keep wages from rising in the
non-agricultural sectors while the provision of capital will help to finance industrial
investment. By exporting some of its produce agriculture also contributes foreign
exchange which is particularly important in countries with few mineral or other exports.
This hard currency is necessary for obtaining the imports of machinery, tools,
equipment, spare parts, fuels, raw materials, and other inputs required for establishing
an industrial sector and keep it going. It is only when the industrial sector can launch
itself in a major way into the export market and thereby generate its own foreign
exchange that this particular role of agriculture becomes less important. Similarly with
capital, once the industrial sector reaches a certain size it is able to finance its own
investment needs without necessary requiring capital from other sectors. As for the
second contribution related to markets. An abundant supply of food will help to keep
food prices low and thus diminish the pressure for higher wages by industrial workers
thereby contribution to the profitability and capital accumulation of industry. While an
abundant supply of agricultural raw materials, such as cotton and leather, will facilitate
the development of industry, such as the textile and shoe industry respectively
(Johnston and Mellor, 1961).
Analysts and policy makers have thus to focus on three major issues regarding
the role of an agricultural surplus for industrialization. First, how best to increase6
agricultural output and to ensure sufficient incentives for farmers to invest and innovate
so as to generate a sufficiently large agricultural surplus. Second, how much surplus
should be transferred out of agriculture and which are the most suitable mechanisms to
extract this agricultural surplus to ensure that not too much is extracted so as not to kill
the goose which lays the golden eggs. Third, what is the best way to use this
agricultural surplus for industrial development so as to ensure that the resources are not
wasted in financing an inefficient industrialization process. Thus the right balance has
to be struck and appropriate linkages have to be developed between agriculture and
industry so as to ensure that a virtuous cycle of economic growth and reinforcing
interactions between agriculture and industry are created. A comparative analysis
between the East Asian NICs and Latin America within this framework can help us to
understand better the reasons for the uneven economic performance of the two regions.
In what follows, I first explore in section 2 to what extent South Korea's and
Taiwan's comprehensive agrarian reform and abolition of landlordism was a significant
factor in its subsequent successful industrialization as compared to Latin America
where agrarian reforms were implemented, if at all, only after its industrialization was
well on its way. In section 3 I analyze Latin America's highly uneven agrarian structure
as well as the economic, social and political impact of the agrarian reforms which were
implemented to a greater or lesser extent in various countries of the region. In section 4
I discuss South Korea's and Taiwan's agrarian transformation as well as the various
contributions which agriculture, in particular the peasantry, made to their industrial
miracle. I then, in section 5, which is perhaps the most interesting contribution of this
essay, compare South Korea's and Taiwan's development strategy and experience with
that of Latin America. The comparative analysis focuses on three key issues: State
capacity and policies, agrarian structure and class relations, and the significance of
certain forms of intersectoral resource flows in development. In the final section I
attempt to reach some general conclusions.
2.  LATIN AMERICA'S INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT AGRARIAN
REFORM: CONTRAST WITH EAST ASIAN NICS
One important difference between the selected Asian countries and Latin
America concerns the timing of the agrarian reform. In South Korea and Taiwan,
agrarian reform came before any significant industrialization had taken place and was a7
key ingredient in the subsequent successful industrialization process. Most agrarian
reforms in Latin America happened after industrialization was already firmly
established and were often seen as a way to revive the flagging industrialization process
due to what has been termed the 'exhaustion of the easy phase of ISI'. But land reform
was not considered as a prerequisite for industrialization in Latin America while in
Taiwan and South Korea land reform was a major factor in getting their
industrialization started. I will argue in this essay that a crucial difference for explaining
the superior economic performance of Taiwan and South Korea compared to Latin
America is that a thoroughgoing agrarian reform took place in these Asian countries
before industrialization and not the other way round as in Latin America, with the
exception of Mexico. Furthermore, Taiwan's and South Korea's agrarian reform had a
far greater redistributive impact than the Latin American agrarian reforms, with the
possible exception of Cuba. It is this rural equity factor which was to have a major
positive impact on Taiwan's and South Korea's industrialization and was the missing
ingredient in Latin America's industrialization.
The above mentioned sequencing factor is rarely mentioned, if at all, in the
comparative analyses of the East Asian and Latin American development experience. It
should be borne in mind though that the main reason for the agrarian reforms in both
regions were political rather than economic. While in South Korea and Taiwan the
landlord class was swept from power at the time of the agrarian reform in Latin
America they managed to hold on to power during the first stages of the industrializ-
ation process managing to block or delay any sort of reform of the land tenure system.
Even when the landlord class no longer could prevent an agrarian reform they often
managed to curtail its implementation or even reverse the process with agrarian
counter-reforms. In Brazil, even today, landlords have been able to forestall any
significant agrarian reform process. This political issue will be discussed further later
on in this essay.
A brief reference to Japan's experience needs to be made due to its influence on
developments in South Korea and Taiwan, before and after they achieved
independence, and because its land reform came after it had started its industrialization
process, like in Latin America. Although Japan's postwar land reform of 1945 came
after it had established a sizeable industrial sector the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912)
had undertaken major agricultural reforms which had swept away the feudal restrictions8
of the Tokugawa regime and enabled agriculture to make a major contribution to
Japan's industrialization. The Meiji government was committed to modernize and
industrialize Japan (Smith, 1959). It realized that to start an industrialization process it
required to extract a surplus from agriculture. It proceeded by stimulating widespread
technological innovations in agriculture without changing the property system or the
operational size of holdings. The government promoted the establishment of research
stations which developed improved rice varieties and other innovations which were
diffused throughout the countryside by a dense network of extension services (Ruttan
and Hayami, 1998). Also the Japanese landlord class was of an unusual nature as they
were non-absentee being devoted to improvements, promoting societies for the spread
of farm improvements such as new agricultural techniques, drainage and superior rice
strains. They did not indulge in high living but invested part of their surplus outside
agriculture helping to finance industrialization (Byres, 1986). Landlords became
modernizers by spreading the innovations to their tenants as the Meiji's new land tax
system encouraged them to do so. But they themselves did not become capitalist
farmers as most of the cultivation remained in the hands of tenants. It was an inclusive
agrarian modernization although within a socially hierarchical and politically
authoritarian system (Dore, 1969).
Taiwan and Korea were Japanese colonies from the end of the 19th century until
Japan's defeat in the Second World War. Following Japan's rice revolt in 1918 the
Japanese government decided to transform Korea and Taiwan into a major rice supplier
of Japan. It thus also got involved in raising rice yields of Korean and Taiwanese
farmers and tenants to the extreme of even using the police to force modern techniques
upon recalcitrant producers. Thus Japan, Taiwan and Korea had a powerful landlord
class, with incentives to invest and modernize, and a peasantry among whom tenancy
was rife paying very high rents to landlords who, in turn, had to pay a high land tax to
the government. There was hardly any landlessness and wage labour and socio-
economic differentiation among the peasantry was limited (Koo, 1970; Morrow &
Sherper, 1970).
In the three Asian countries agriculture has been an essential source of
accumulation in industry, and their States have been effectively, pervasively and
ruthlessly central to the whole process. Taiwan's and South Korea's case differs from
pre-1945 Japan as the landlord class was practically absent as most of them had been9
expropriated by the time Taiwan and South Korea started to industrialize in the 1950s.
Instead the landlords' place was been taken by a repressive but developmentalist State
which imposed agricultural modernization from above and appropriated the peasants'
economic surplus to set up, finance and direct the industrialization process. Thus in
Taiwan and South Korea agricultural modernization was achieved without the landlords
contrary to Japan where landlords played an important part in raising agricultural
productivity, thereby increasing the potential agricultural surplus, but also in facilitating
the appropriation and transfer of this surplus from agriculture to industry particularly
during the Meiji period. It was, of course, the peasants and tenants who generated the
bulk of this surplus. All this was achieved by the developmentalist policies of the
powerful and authoritarian Meiji State (Dore, 1959).
Meanwhile in Latin America, with the exception of Mexico, agrarian reform
came when ISI had largely outlived its purpose. Thus Latin American governments saw
agrarian reform as a means of widening the internal market for domestic industry giving
it a new lease of life due to the expected income distributional effects in favour of
peasant beneficiaries. Governments also hoped that food output would rise thereby
avoiding increases in food prices and hence pressure for higher wages by industrial
workers. Increases in food output would also help to keep agricultural imports in check
and thus free scarce foreign exchange earnings for essential imports required by
domestic industry. Furthermore, in Latin America, contrary to Taiwan and South Korea,
land reform was not seen as a mechanism to squeeze agriculture. On the contrary, it was
realized that, at least in its initial phase, land reforms might possibly require more
resources from the rest of the economy, particularly from the State, than hitherto. Land
reform was also seen as a means of making agriculture more attractive to rural labour
thereby hoping that rural outmigration might decline. This was a desired goal as Latin
American industrialization had been unable to provide sufficient employment and thus
rural outmigration created an unwanted burden for the urban sector and the State.
Meanwhile in the Asian countries the rural sector's provision of an abundant and cheap
labour force was welcomed by the rapidly expanding industrial sector.
By comparison with South Korea and Taiwan agrarian reform in Latin America
came too late and generally was too limited. Too late in the sense that Latin America's
agrarian reform came after industrialization had already made significant progress and a
certain industrial structure had become already firmly established after half a century or10
longer since a significant process of industrialization has started. But this does not
necessarily mean that Latin America's agricultural sector did not make an important
contribution to its industrialization. My argument is that an earlier, and above all, more
drastic agrarian reform in Latin America would have given a timely and far greater
impetus to Latin America's industrialization as well as creating a different type of
industrial structure which would also be geared towards satisfying the demands for
industrial products by the lower income groups. A more egalitarian income distribution
would have resulted in a more appropriate industrial structure which would be more
labour intensive and less demanding of foreign exchange. It might thus have made the
industrialization process more sustainable by, for example, avoiding the 'exhaustion' or
crisis experienced by ISI due to the smallness of the domestic market and the foreign
exchange constraint (Thorp, 1998).
Latin American agricultural exports flourished during the second half of the
19th century as the region became a major supplier of agricultural commodities to the
expanding European market which was experiencing rapid industrialization and
urbanization. Given the relative abundant land and labour resources of Latin America it
was possible for the landlord class to respond to the increasing world demand for food
and agricultural raw materials. Agricultural expansion was able to proceed by
incorporating more land and employing more labour with relatively little capital
requirements. There was little pressure on agriculture to introduce technological
changes. This agricultural export-led growth was sufficient to induce the establishment
of some industries largely linked to the processing of agricultural raw materials and
some basic consumer goods industries. Thus the agricultural surplus, in some instances
together with a mining surplus derived from the exploitation of minerals like tin, copper
or oil, was able to finance the beginnings of the industrialization process.
When the land frontier began to reach its limit (in some countries already in the
1930s while in others in more recent decades) the easy phase of agricultural expansion
came to an end and competition between the economic sectors for capital became more
intense. Continuing agricultural growth required increasingly capital investments, new
technologies and changing production patterns to more profitable agricultural products.
Furthermore, the shift in many Latin American countries from a primary-product-
exporting development process toward an inward-directed ISI strategy after the crisis of
the 1930s, intensified the pressures on agriculture. In the postwar period Latin11
American agriculture increasingly failed to meet the demands of industrialization
becoming an obstacle to further economic development. Agriculture's share in the value
of total Latin American exports declined from well over half in the 1950s to one-fifth in
the 1990s while the share of agricultural imports within total imports increased (IDB,
2000). In some Latin American countries a previous positive agricultural trade balance
had even turned negative, i.e. agricultural imports began to exceed exports of
agricultural commodities (ECLAC, 1999). The agricultural sector was no longer able to
sustain the contribution which it had made in the past to the region's economic
development and in some countries had even become a burden to the economy.
The increasing failings of agriculture prompted governments into action and
they put in place a series of measures since the 1950s trying to encourage the
modernization of the estates and commercial farms. Among such measures were
subsidized credits for the purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment, for
improving the quality of livestock, for acquiring fertilizers and improved seed varieties,
and the delivery of technical assistance programmes. Consequently large commercial
farmers began to shift to higher value added crops which were in increasing demand by
urban consumers and to capitalize their enterprises through land improvements (for
example drainage and irrigation), upgrading infrastructure, mechanization, etc. Thus
during the 1960s and 1970s a shift towards the intensification of Latin American
agriculture took place (Figueroa, 1993). This process of modernization can be
characterized as the 'landlord road' to agrarian capitalism as landlords themselves
transform their large landed estates into commercial profit-oriented capitalized farms.
Also green revolution type technologies, involving improved seeds, were increasingly
adopted. In the late 1960s only one-tenth of Latin America's wheat area was sown with
high-yield varieties but by the late 1990s this had risen to nine-tenth. The spread of the
green revolution, a technological package much favoured by the transnational
agribusiness, also contributed to the increased use of fertilizers and pesticides (David,
Dirven and Vogelgesang, 2000). This intensification of agriculture meant that growth in
output was increasingly achieved by an increase in the productivity of the various
factors of production. However up to the 1980s the expansion of agriculture's land area
still accounted for sixty per cent of output growth; thereafter the intensive margin
predominated as a source of agricultural growth (Ortega 1992: 123). However, this
process of capitalization has proceeded unevenly in different Latin American countries12
widening the heterogeneity between capitalist farmers and peasants (Kay, 1999; David,
Morales and Rodrigues, 2000). In Brazil, agriculture continues to expand to an
important -though lesser extent- extent, via the extensive margin due to the colonization
of the Amazonian frontier. Furthermore, within agriculture capitalization has been
largely confined to the commercial farm sector which has received the lions share of the
vast amounts of highly subsidized state credit, leaving peasant agriculture without the
means to modernize (Helfand, 1999).
It is during the stage of ISI that the shortcomings of agriculture became manifest
as agricultural production was unable to keep pace with the increasing requirements of
industry for cheap food and foreign exchange. While the pressure on agriculture
intensified at the same time government policies increasingly favoured industry at the
expense of agriculture thereby denying agriculture sufficient resources for its
modernization. Demands for land reform became increasingly vociferous during the
1950s and 1960s when the failings of the agricultural sector became more evident.
Government technocrats were willing to contemplate mild land reforms on the
increasing evidence by scholars and international agencies (CIDA, 1966-70) which
showed the inefficiencies of the then prevailing agrarian system which in its basic
structure had remained the same since the colonial period (Chonchol, 1994). Large
scale agriculture and/or cattle ranching undertaken in plantations, latifundios, haciendas
or estancias had even consolidated its position further during the export-growth phase
from the 1850s to the 1930s.
Industrialization and urbanization changed also the political landscape as the
emerging industrial proletariat supported anti-establishment parties. The peasantry also
grew increasingly restless as it was no longer willing to accept its poverty nor the
domination of landlords. Peasant discontent and protest was becoming more
widespread and intense. Political parties of the centre and the left became more willing
to channel the demands of peasants and therefore included the agrarian reform issue in
their political programmes. While rural unionization, better wages and working
conditions had already been part and parcel of some of these programmes but the land
reform issue added a qualitatively new element as it potentially challenged the
economic and political hegemony of the landlord class. In short, both economic and
social pressures put the land reform issue onto the political agenda (Thiesenhusen,
1989).13
3.  LATIN AMERICA'S AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND LAND REFORM
Latin America had and in many countries, despite land reforms, continues to
have the most polarized agrarian structure in the world. At one extreme were the
minifundistas who own minifundios (very small landholdings) and, at the other were the
latifundistas who own latifundios (very large landholdings) in the form of plantations,
haciendas and estancias. By 1960 latifundios constituted roughly five per cent of farm
units and owned about four-fifths of the land while minifundios comprised four-fifths of
farm units but had only five per cent of the land (Barraclough, 1973: 16). The middle-
sized farm sector was relatively insignificant, except in Argentina. Peasants holdings
were the main providers of employment, accounting for about half of the agricultural
labour force, four-fifths of whom were unpaid family workers. Large estates employed
less than one-fifth of the agricultural labour force. In 1960 an estimated one third of the
total agricultural labour force was landless and a variety of tenancy arrangements were
widespread, an estimated one-quarter (or more) of agricultural workers being tenants or
squatters (op. cit.: 19-23).
This agrarian system was not only highly unequal but also inefficient. On the
one hand, latifundios underutilized land by farming it in an extensive manner and
leaving a significant proportion uncultivated. On the other hand, minifundios were
wasteful of labour, using too much labour on too little land. Not surprisingly, while
labour productivity was much higher on latifundios than on minifundios, the reverse
was the case regarding land productivity. Average production per agricultural worker
was about five to ten times higher on latifundios than on minifundios, while production
per hectare of agricultural land was roughly three to five times higher on minifundios
relative to latifundios (op. cit.: 25-27).
The dominance of the latifundia was first successfully challenged by the
revolutionary upheavals of 1910-17 in Mexico. However, it was not until the populist
government of Cárdenas during 1934 to 1940 that the hacienda system finally lost its
predominant influence in Mexico. The Bolivian revolution of the early 1950s also dealt
a major blow to the landlord system with the implementation of an extensive agrarian
reform programme. While landlords no longer dominated the political system in the
post-war period in many Latin American countries, they still exerted a major influence
on government policy and could swing the power of the State in their favour regarding
relations between landlords and peasants (Huber and Safford, 1995). Tenants had to pay14
high rents (either in money, kind or labour-services) and agricultural workers were paid
low wages and had poor working conditions. Rural labour was largely unorganized and
confronted a series of legal obstacles to unionization. Working conditions throughout
rural Latin America were exploitative and repressive (Duncan and Rutledge, 1977).
The Cuban revolution of 1959 signalled the final demise of the hacienda system
in most Latin American countries. Fearful of the spread of revolution to other countries
in the region and the spectre of socialism, the US government launched the Alliance for
Progress initiative. This encouraged governments throughout the region to implement
agrarian reform programmes by providing economic aid. Consequently, from the 1960s
to the 1970s a spate of agrarian reforms took place in Latin America among them Chile,
Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. In the late 1970s and 1980s following the Sandinista
revolution in Nicaragua and the civil war in El Salvador agrarian reforms were also
carried out in those countries. Only in Argentina has agrarian reform been completely
absent. The uniqueness of the Argentinean case is explained in part by the relative
importance of family and middle-sized capitalist farms as well as by the relatively high
degree of urbanization. Paraguay and Uruguay had colonization programmes but in
neither country has a significant agrarian reform taken place. Finally, in Brazil the
colonization of the vast Amazonian region relieved for some time the pressure on land
redistribution. But above all strong opposition from landlords stalled any significant
agrarian reform although there has been some minor land redistribution since the
restoration of democratic rule in the mid-1980s.
Agrarian reforms have generally been the outcome of political changes from
above. Although in some instances these were responding to social pressures from
below, urban social forces and even international forces, as in the case of the Alliance
for Progress, played an important role in bringing about land reform. While the
peasantry was not the only social force behind agrarian reform legislation, it did
significantly influence its implementation as those areas where rural protest was
strongest tended to receive the most attention from land reform agencies. Technocratic
and reformist governments seeking to modernize agriculture and integrate the peasantry
generally initiated land reforms. Not surprisingly they confronted opposition from
landlords who, in some instances, succeeded in blocking or reversing it. Agrarian
reforms are social processes whose unintended consequences may redirect the initial
purpose of the land reform along radical or conservative lines (but usually the latter) or15
in some instances derail it completely. This in Guatemala President Arbenz's agrarian
reform of 1952 was brought to an abrupt end in 1954 when he was overthrown by an
armed invasion which received support from the US government and expropriations
were quickly reversed (Brockett, 1988: 100). In Chile Frei's moderate agrarian reform
of 1964-1970 fuelled demands from the peasant movement for intensification of the
reform process. The radicalization of the peasant movement was a factor helping
Allende to win the presidency in 1970. Peasant radicalism in turn pushed Allende's
democratic socialist programme for expropriations beyond what was originally intended
(Kay, 1978). The subsequent military coup of 1973, which repressed and disarticulated
the peasant movement, returned only a proportion of the expropriated land to former
owners as they did not dare to undo the land reform completely.
As for the economic aspects of Latin America's agrarian reform their impact on
agricultural production has been mixed. In general results fell well below expectations
for a variety of reasons such as poor administration of the expropriated farms which
were often organized into production cooperatives, lack of governmental support
services such as technical assistance and marketing services, and political disruption by
landlords and others groups opposing the agrarian reform (Thiesenhusen, 1989).
Furthermore, governments continued with the cheap food policy as well as with the
overvalued currency which had a detrimental effect on the profitability and thus
investment on the reformed sector. Industrialization continued to be the overriding
concern of governments as land reforms were essentially implemented for political
rather than economic reasons. Agrarian reforms on the whole did not give the hoped for
boost to industrialization either in terms of an increased gross agricultural surplus or in
terms of significantly widening the domestic market for industrial commodities through
increased sales to the rural population. In some instances, particularly in Peru,
governments tried to entice landlords who had some or all of their land expropriated to
invest the bonds they had received as compensation payment in industrial ventures but
without much success. Landlords became distrustful of governments and often the
economic climate during the more radical type of agrarian reforms was too uncertain.
Agrarian reforms certainly did not come cheap in terms of government
expenditure as, at least in some cases, landlords were compensated for their
expropriated land, the debts of land reform beneficiaries were often condoned or
partially written off, the administrative public bureaucracies dealing with the land16
reform could be large and expensive, and so on. But land reforms beneficiaries
generally did benefit as their standard of living improved as well as the provision of a
variety of social services which often accompanied agrarian reforms. The land reform
implementation period, which could last from a few years to one, and sometimes more
than one decade, often was the only brief time in the peasants' history during which
government agrarian policy could be said to have had a peasant bias as in some cases
significant government resources were channelled to the land reform beneficiaries (Kay,
1999).
As for the social and political aspects of Latin America's agrarian reform the
gains were also less than expected and in some instances even lead to reversals as a
result of counter-reforms (Thiesenhusen, 1995). Social equity was not much advanced
by the limited gains achieved in income distribution. The initial positive redistributivist
impact of many land reforms in Latin America was often cancelled out by the poor
performance of the reformed sector and by macroeconomic factors such as
unfavourable internal terms of trade and foreign exchange policy. Furthermore, by
excluding the poorest segments of the rural population, such as peasant community
members (comuneros), minifundista smallholders and seasonal wage labourers from
land redistribution many reforms merely increased socio-economic differentiation
among the peasantry. Whatever meagre improvements land reforms achieved for the
rural poor these were partially cancelled out during the so-called lost decade of the
1980s provoked by Latin America's debt crisis and the structural adjustment
programmes.
The greatest contribution of agrarian reforms was in the stimulus given to
institution building in the countryside. Governments facilitated the organization of the
peasantry into trade unions and cooperatives of various kinds, such as producer,
marketing and credit associations. This brought about a considerable degree of
integration of the peasantry into the national economy, society and polity. Prior to
reform, insurmountable obstacles lay in the way of peasants creating their own
organizations. Political parties began to contend for the peasant vote and extended their
networks to rural areas where in the past reformist and left wing political parties in
particular had often been excluded by the landed oligarchy. With the land reform
peasant participation in civil society was much enhanced. Many peasants, especially
when granted a land title, felt that only then had they become citizens of the country. By17
weakening the power of landlords and other dominant groups in the countryside, land
reforms encouraged the emergence of a greater voice for the peasantry in local and
national affairs. However, the peasantry's greater organizational and participatory
presence did not embrace all categories of peasants and all regions of the country. There
were also setbacks from which, in some instances, peasants have been unable to recover
until today.
Generalizing, agrarian reforms in Latin America were often restricted in scope
and thwarted in their aims by opposition forces or by government mismanagement.
However, in those countries where agrarian transformation went deeper and where
poverty and social exclusion were significantly reduced, some degree of social stability,
political integration and economic development ensued. Hence it is possible to argue
that, from a longer term perspective, agrarian reforms have promoted, if still
precariously, social stability and contributed to the democratization of society, albeit
with setbacks in some instances. Whilst land reforms marked a watershed in the history
of rural society in many Latin American countries, the root causes of social and
political instability will remain as long as relatively high levels of rural poverty and
peasant marginalization persist. It can be concluded that agrarian reforms provide a
framework for growth, equity and sustainable development in rural society only when
accompanied by complementary policies and appropriate macroeconomic measures.
Whilst a favourable external environment can facilitate agrarian change, internal
transformations remain critical for its success. Rather than regarding agrarian reform as
a panacea, it is best seen as an instrument of transformation, albeit an important one, for
the achievement of these objectives.
4.  AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA
In this section I will examine the characteristics of South Korea's and Taiwan's
agrarian transformation and, in particular, the contribution which agriculture and the
agrarian reforms made to their remarkable industrialization process. I will then, in the
next section, undertake a comparative study between the Asian cases and Latin
America.18
4.1  Agrarian Reform and Development in South Korea
Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945 and South Korea gained its
independence in 1948. It was largely a rural country with over four-fifth of the
population being rural in the mid-1940s. Landed property was concentrated as about
half of the farmland was owned by less than five percent of farm households. However,
most of the land was actually farmed by tenants and some hired labourers. Tenants were
mainly sharecroppers living at subsistence levels. At the end of the Second World War
in 1945, the landlord-tenant system predominated. According to Morrow and Sherper
(1970) about half of total farm households were tenants, only 14 percent were owner-
operated and the remainder were part owner-operated. Tenants farmed almost two-
thirds of the land. As for the size of the farm units these were very small due to
country's high population density and the unequal ownership of land. Almost three-
quarters of farm households were below one hectare in size while, on the other extreme,
farms over ten hectares comprised only 1.2 per cent of households. After the land
reform the farms over three hectares practically disappeared as all land above this
ceiling was to be expropriated. But the proportion of farms below one hectare did not
change much.
The South-Korean land reform was a typical land to the tiller programme as all
tenants were entitled to ownership of the land they farmed. Before the land reform was
even implemented rents were reduced as soon as the new administration took over
control from the Japanese in 1945. There had already been frequent and damaging
strikes in the past against the tenancy system and in the 1930s there was major agitation
for refusing to pay rents (Jeon and Kim, 2000). Rents could not exceed one-third of the
production while previously farm rents averaged 40-60 per cent of production. As soon
as the war was over and the Japanese were defeated tenants began to campaign again
for a reduction in rental payments as well as for land redistribution. The target at first
were Japanese landlords but it soon extended to Korean landlords. The South Korean
authorities could not ignore the fact that the nationalist revolt against Japanese colonial
rule at the end of Second World War contained a strong element of anti-landlord
agitation. Nor could the government disregard the actions taken by North Korean
government which already by 1946 confiscated landlords' land without compensation
and distributed it to tenants free of charge. These events prompted many South Korea
landlords to sell their land to tenants even before the legislation was formally enacted in19
1950. It is estimated that as much as half of the landlords' land changed hands in this
way (Jeon and Kim, 2000). The South Korea leadership used also the land reform as a
means to build up a political power base and to weaken the political threat it faced from
the strongest political force which was organized in the landlord-dominated Korean
Democratic Party. Thus South Korea's land reform was mainly the result of political
circumstances.
The land reform mainly affected the tenure status as tenants became owners but
had only a limited impact on the size distribution of operational holdings. As expected
farm ownership greatly increased after the land reform constituting almost 70 percent of
farm households while tenancy declined to seven percent in 1965. As for the size
distribution of farms this changed less dramatically but there was a slight improvement.
The percentage of farms below half a hectare declined from 41 percent to 35.5 percent
while those between one and two hectares increased from 19 percent to 26 percent
between 1947 and 1968 (Morrow and Sherper, 1970). However, contrary to the
intention of the land reform legislation, tenancy has increased continually since the late
1960s to the extent that by 1986 30.5 percent of the country's total farmland was under
tenancy. This is a very high percentage compared with seven percent in Japan and five
percent in Taiwan (Boyer and Man Ahn, 1991).
Various factors worked in favour of the implementation of a sweeping land
reform. Above all there was the overriding need to neutralize communist influence and
reduce class conflicts so as to stabilize the newly established republic politically given
the conflict with North Korea and the internal turmoil. The war with North Korea
eliminated any possible landlord opposition to the land reform and strengthened the
claim of tenants to land ownership. For geopolitical reasons the country received major
international support, especially from the USA, politically as well as economically. The
US administration was strongly in favour of the land reform programme. The imple-
mentation of the agrarian reform was facilitated by the existence of a relatively
competent bureaucracy and of adequate records on land ownership and tenure relations.
There were many obstacles to overcome such as the country's limited land base which
meant that many farms were below an optimal size. The government also had insuffi-
cient resources to provide adequate assistance to peasant farmers and was only able to
pay a very limited compensation to expropriated landlords (Morrow and Sherper,
1970).20
Despite these difficulties the agrarian reform was a major success. With the
reduction in class differences and the transfer of ownership rights to tenants class
conflicts were substantially reduced and political stability was achieved in the
countryside. The rural sector released a steady supply of labour to the urban sector
which made possible the rapid expansion of the labour-intensive industrialization and
underpinned its export success. By the late 1960s the urban population was already half
of the country's total population and the rural population was even declining in absolute
terms alleviating the pressure on land. Last, but not least, the agricultural sector
released a major economic surplus in the form of an abundant and cheap supply of food
and raw materials to the urban sector. Until the early 1960s the State extracted a surplus
from peasant farmers by fixing procurement prices of certain staple foods below the
cost of production, and thereafter they continued to be fixed below market prices but
allowed for a meagre profit (Lee, 1979). Although foreign aid reduced the need to
squeeze the peasantry it did prevent the squeeze. For example, PL 480 food aid turned
the terms of trade against agriculture from 1963 to 1971.
Evidence indicates that the transformation of tenants into owners created a
major incentive for the increase in efficiency and production, mainly of rice, achieved
by the peasantry (Jeon and Kim, 2000). The standard of living only gradually improved
for the peasantry despite their sustained increases in productivity thereby explaining the
massive exodus of the rural population to the cities in search for better conditions.
Much of this increased efficiency was creamed off by the State to finance the
industrialization process. The State played an active role in promoting this higher
efficiency but this was done in an authoritarian manner and without much economic
support from the State. Due to the disappearances of the landlords the State filled the
political vacuum and directly controlled the mass of the peasantry. This was achieved
by dispatching a large number of government officials into the countryside, by
appointing village leaders, through political indoctrination and direct mobilizations of
the rural population. The State also made peasants dependent by establishing a
monopoly over key agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, credit, and irrigation. Peasants
were often forced to accept government directive and had to negotiate on an unequal
basis with local government officials on the supply of inputs and sale of their output.
Much coercion was applied to thrust high-yielding-variety seeds and technological
packages on an often reluctant farming population. Through these methods the dirigiste21
and authoritarian State forced the pace of agricultural modernization to the extent that
South Korean farmers achieved exceptionally high yields at a very low financial cost to
the State (Wade, 1983).
Government authorities had hoped that landlords would provide a major source
of finance for industrialization but due to the limited compensation payments this was
only partially achieved. Most of the funding for industrialization came from the
economic surplus extracted by the State from the peasantry. Another important source
was foreign aid and later foreign investment. Food aid in particular played an important
role during the 1960s when the country imported large quantities of cheap or free food
from the US. The State played a pivotal role in supplying foreign exchange and
investment resources to industry at a highly subsidized rate. The State could accomplish
this as it owned many banks, intervened heavily in financial markets and controlled the
foreign exchange allocations, besides fixing the interest and foreign exchange rates. For
example, the amount of subsidy received by industry in the allocation of foreign
exchange amounted to about 10-14% of annual gross national product (GNP) during the
1950s and industry received almost half of total domestic bank loans in 1970 while
contributing only one-fifth to GDP (Cho, 1997). While manufacturing exports were
prioritized in the 1960s, it was the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s.
In short, the state played a key role in the development process of South Korea.
The State was strong and had a high degree of autonomy from the domestic classes in
deciding what specific forms of capital accumulation to promote. Through the land
reform a relatively egalitarian farming system was created but at the same time the State
greatly increased its control over the countryside. About half of the total farm land was
transferred to the beneficiaries and two-thirds of all farm households received land
under the land reform. Practically no landless peasants or agricultural proletariat exists
and socio-economic differentiation is limited. However, the State subordinated the rural
sector to the overriding goal of industrialization. Thus rural-urban disparities widened
as the fruits of the spectacular economic growth were only shared to a limited extent
with the peasantry (Koo, 1984). It is thus not surprising to find that the peasantry voted
with their feet by emigrating on masse to the urban sector providing the necessary
cheap labour for rapidly growing labour-intensive industries. It could be argued that
South Korea's phenomenal economic success was achieved on the back of the
peasantry.22
4.2  Agrarian Reform and Development in Taiwan
The agrarian reform in Taiwan was implemented against the background of a
popular uprising in 1946 and the need for the Kuomintang government to gain popular
support in the countryside as well as impose its authority on the local Taiwanese elite.
The Taiwanese government was formed by the nationalist forces of the Kuomintang
who had to flee from mainland China after their defeat by the communist forces led by
Mao. They were of a different ethnic background than the local Taiwanese and were
thus keen to gain legitimacy among the local population. The land reform consisted of
three stages. First, as from 1949 onwards farm rents were reduced from the common
rate of 50 per cent of the harvest down to 37.5 per cent. This measure benefited about
40 per cent of all farm households. At the second stage the government sold all the land
which had been in the hands of Japanese nationals benefiting roughly 20 per cent of
tenant farmers and covering about a fifth of the country's farmland. In the third, and
final stage, the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953 was ordained by which landlords were
obliged to sell all tenanted land above 3 hectares of paddy field (or equivalent) to the
government which then resold it to tenants. Landlords received a fair price and the
payments by tenants for the land did not exceed the 37.5 per cent they previously paid
as rent. By 1956 the number of tenant farmers only constituted about 16 per cent of all
farm families while owner-farmers had increased to almost 60 per cent of the total, the
remainder being largely part owner-farmers having own land as well as a tenancy
(Huizer, 1980: 53). The government achieved two goals simultaneously by, on the one
hand, transforming most tenants into owners and, on the other hand, transforming
landlords into new entrepreneurs as they were compensated with shares in publicly
owned industrial enterprises or with government bonds which they could invest in
business and other new ventures.
Among the factors which contributed to Taiwan's successful agrarian reform are
the wide diffusion of improved farming methods due to a well organized system of
agricultural extension, major investments in irrigation and drainage, an effective credit
system which helped to finance the use of modern inputs, and an expanding market for
agricultural produce. Sometimes the State-driven innovation package was too forceful
as force was used to compel peasant to adopt the new technologies by using some of the
police as extension workers. Innovation in agriculture was characterized by increased
use of fertilizers and agro-chemicals combined with greater use of new crop varieties.23
Furthermore, the expansion of irrigation facilitated the spread of the green revolution
technologies and allowed multiple cropping. What is remarkable is that the shift to
more intensive cultivation patterns already started in the mid-1920s when Taiwan was a
Japanese colony (Lee, 1971). The Japanese made significant efforts to develop
agriculture in their colony by reforming the tenancy system and promoting new
techniques, new varieties of seeds and inputs, such as chemical fertilizers, through the
formation of a variety of farmers' associations who provided extension services to their
members (Ho, 1971). These non-mechanical innovations were well suited for Taiwan's
small scale and labour-intensive farming where the average farm size varied during the
last century between one and two hectares (Koo, 1970). As a consequence of the
widespread application of these innovations land and labour productivity rose steadily.
In the postwar period the agricultural sector made a major contribution to
industrialization and the country's development. There was a major transfer of
agriculture's economic surplus to the rest of the economy. While before the war an
important instrument for this transfer was the land tax, after the war the less visible
terms of trade mechanism accounted for over half of agriculture's capital outflow and
the remainder was captured by a variety of taxes and levies. Farmers had to pay high
prices for fertilizers and other chemical inputs while they received low prices for their
produce. For example they had to deliver a certain quota of rice and sugar at low prices
to the government procurement agencies. Owners of paddy land were obliged to deliver
to the state a quota of rice and to pay a substantial land tax in rice. Furthermore,
fertilizer was only available to rice farmers in exchange for rice. These deliveries to the
state were valued at a single rate below the market rate. For example, in the period
1952-1968 this averaged 70 per cent of the market price (Moore, 1988: 10).
The extraction of various surpluses from agriculture made undoubtedly a major
contribution to the initial stage of industrial development. The provision of cheap rice
kept industrial wages low, boosted industrial profits and enhanced industrial exports.
Taxes on agriculture provided the State with domestic financial resources which could
be used for investment in industry. The export of sugar and rice, which was acquired
through the monopolistic State procurement system of agricultural commodities like
sugar and rice, allowed, on the one hand, that the terms of trade could be turned against
the farmers and, on the other hand, generated valuable foreign exchange earnings which
the State could channel towards the import of the necessary machinery, equipment, and24
raw materials for industry. The manipulation of the terms of trade also ensured that
agricultural labour was willing to work for a lower wage in the industrial sector than
would have been the case otherwise as the returns to agricultural labour were lower
than they would have been without agriculture's unfavourable terms of trade.
Taiwan's industrialization differs from South Korea's in that large industrial
conglomerates were less common and many industries were located in rural areas. This
had the advantage that rural industries could pay even lower wages than urban
industries as they could draw more easily on cheap labour which was willing to work at
a lower wage rate as some of the subsistence expenses were covered by the farm
household where the worker continued to live. It also made it easier to hire and fire
workers as well as employ them on a temporary basis as they could always rely on the
peasant household for their survival. This is one of the reasons which made it more
difficult to organize industrial workers and is also a factor which helps to explain the
low level of industrial militancy (Ranis, 1979).
Despite this squeeze farmers continued to innovate as well as save their meagre
surpluses thereby helping to finance Taiwan's industrialization. According to Ishikawa
(1990) and Karshenas (1995) these from-above-driven improvements in agricultural
productivity made it possible for agriculture to generate a major economic surplus
which the government effectively captured and steered largely toward the industrial
sector. At a later stage as farm household incomes gradually improved and voluntary
savings increased it was no longer necessary for the State to use compulsory or hidden
mechanisms to achieve the same objective. The State made major efforts to promote
voluntary rural savings in the countryside by a variety of incentives and by establishing
a series of savings and banking institutions in rural areas to the extent that by the 1960s
already rural households were saving one-fifth of their incomes (Ong, Adams and
Singh, 1976).
While many authors highlight Taiwan's success only a few emphasize the less
pleasant aspect of this modernization from above. Among these few is Apthorpe (1979)
who argues that the distributivist land reform was but a facade behind which an autho-
ritarian regime defended its own existence as well as ensuring a massive transfer of
resources out of agriculture. The former tenants had to pay new taxes to the State, pay
higher prices for inputs and received lower prices for their products than before the land
reform. The State had taken the place of landlords in terms of power and surplus extrac-25
tion. Moreover, the fact that landlords had been expropriated removed the countryside's
most influential force in agricultural policy making. The land reform was also designed
to destroy the base of the emergent middle class as it was to aid the tenants. It was the
middle class which had produced the leaders of revolts against the Japanese and in 1947
against the Kuomintang. From a political point of view the land reform achieved its
objective by reducing tenancy conflicts and by transferring power in the countryside
from landlords to statal or para-statal authorities. While in the past it was landlords who
subjected the peasantry after the land reform it was the State. This also facilitated
control of the State over the Farmers Association (Wade, 1984). Peasant household
farmers also found it notoriously difficult to organize politically. Thus farmers were in
a weak position to resist the State's squeeze. Nevertheless, the massive squeeze of the
peasantry should be put in perspective as in the inter-sectoral capital flow from agri-
culture to industry the requisitioning of Japanese assets and the massive US aid was
also important contributing almost a third of total capital formation in the 1950s.
But the industrialization induced squeeze only lasted for some decades as there
has been a shift from urban to rural bias during the 1970s. Due the country's successful
industrialization the labour surplus gradually vanished and real industrial wages began
to rise (Kuznets, 1979). Agricultural labour costs also increased and agriculture was
unable to keep up its dynamism. This prompted the government to abolish the rice-
fertilizer barter scheme in the early 1970s (Thorbecke, 1979). Within a few years the
official rice purchase price almost doubled. Agriculture became increasingly inefficient
relative to world agriculture and required increasing protection against imports. It also
became a net recipient of subsidies from the State. The shift from industrial to
agricultural bias was made possible also by the fact that industry was now able to
generate its own surplus for financing capital accumulation. While peasant farming was
an initial advantage at higher levels of development the limitations of small scale
farming were becoming increasingly to the fore (Huang, 1993). There comes a stage in
agriculture's development process where land has to be consolidated and farm size has
to increase so as to be able to take advantage of economies of scale.26
5.  ASIAN MIRACLES AND LATIN AMERICA'S MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES
The spectacular and unexpected success of the Asian miracle countries has left a
deep imprint on scholars and policy makers. It has irked in particular Latin Americans.
After all Latin America had achieved independence a century or century-and-a-half
before countries like South Korea and Taiwan, although the latter had a much briefer
colonial experience as compared to Latin America. More significantly, many Latin
American countries had by the time South Korea and Taiwan gained independence after
the Second World War Two, a far higher standard of living and level of
industrialization, urbanization, education and health. But in the space of a few decades
the picture had changed dramatically. While the Latin American NICs had achieved
relatively high rates of economic growth in the postwar period this change drastically
with the debt crisis (see below). By the 1980s South Korea and Taiwan had overtaken
even the more developed countries of Latin America such as Argentina, Uruguay and
Chile (Chan, 1987). The success of the Asian countries while pointing out the
possibilities for rapid and sustained growth also revealed the limitations of the Latin
American development model (Ranis and Orrock, 1985; Gereffi and Wyman, 1987;
Lin, 1988) and exacerbated the sense of frustration which was already felt by Latin
American scholars and policy makers well before the Asian success of the NICs (Pinto,
1958; Fishlow, 1989).
The beginnings of the main divergence in economic performance between Latin
America and the East Asian NICs can be dated to the oil crisis of mid-1970s but the
watershed was marked by the debt crisis of the 1980s. The vast foreign exchange
surpluses of the oil-exporting countries due to the tripling of the oil price in 1973 meant
that borrowing became cheap and Latin American countries became heavily indebted.
However, the fall in raw material prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at the same
time as interest rates rose sharply, resulted in the debt crisis as countries were unable to
repay their debts. This led to the so-called 'lost decade' of the 1980s as the Latin
American economies failed to grow during this period. Africa was also much affected
by the debt crisis but the East Asian NICs, and particularly South Korea and Taiwan,
were able to ride the storm as they judiciously had relied on their own savings and
foreign exchange resources rather than engaging in Latin America's 'dance of the
millions'. Furthermore, Latin America had squandered much of these millions (or rather27
billions) of dollars it had borrowed as a considerable part of it went to finance the
imports of consumer goods for the upper income groups. In short, while the East Asian
NICs continued to surge ahead the 1980s, the Latin American NICs experienced an
absolute as well as a relative decline (Gereffi, 1990).
In this section I am seeking to account for the different development trajectory
and performance of the selected Asian cases and Latin America, particularly regarding
the role of agriculture. I am less concerned with deriving policy conclusions from the
comparative analysis as this is fraught with pitfalls, especially in view of the different
historical context (Legler, 1999) and as there is no single path to development (Akyüz,
1998). In many ways South Korea and Taiwan are a special case and their success
cannot be easily replicated, if at all (Woo-Cumings, 1997; Jenkins, 1991a). But this
does not mean that lessons cannot be learned and that these might not have policy
relevance (Evans, 1998; Taylor, 1997). My aim though is limited to account for some
key factors which might enlighten our understanding of this spectacular turn around.
There are three main issues which I consider particularly relevant in explaining the
differences and which merit further reflection within a comparative perspective. First,
the nature and policy making capability of the State. Second, the agrarian land tenure,
class configuration and agrarian policy pursued. Third, the particular interactions
between the agricultural and industrial sectors in the process of development as well as
the State's industrial strategy. I will analyze each of these three interrelated themes in
what follows.
5.1  State Capacity and Policy
In South Korea and Taiwan the State played a far more pivotal role in
transforming agriculture and developing the industrial sector as compared to Latin
America. While in several Latin American countries a developmentalist State emerged
which promoted industrialization it had far less control over the industrial bourgeoisie,
the financial sector and the economy in general as compared to the South Korean and
Taiwanese State. Furthermore, the State in South Korea and Taiwan had a considerably
stronger grip over the agricultural sector than the Latin American State. This difference
is explained by the much greater degree of autonomy from society of the South Korean
and Taiwanese State (Anglade and Fortín, 1990). As both countries had been ruled by
Japan for over half a century the local indigenous population, except the local elite, had28
little, if any, influence upon the authoritarian colonial State. After the Second World
War, when they achieved independence after the defeat of the Japanese by the Allied
Forces, the new regime was also autocratic. Only in the last decade or so has there been
a transition toward democratic forms of governance. The South Korean and Taiwanese
States had substantial social, political and even cultural control over the population and
were also able to mobilize their energies for hard work and productive purposes to an
extent inconceivable in Latin America. South Korea's and Taiwan's bureaucracy was
also more disciplined and more committed to the ideology, goals and activities of State
than was the case in Latin America. These factors, which gave South Korea and Taiwan
a greater State capacity, facilitated the implementation of the governments'
developmentalist agenda.
This relative autonomy of the State was justified by the rulers as being necessary
for preventing a communist take over of the country as well as for reasons of national
development. This was not challenged by the US government which not only accepted
the authoritarian governance but also provided major economic and military aid to
South Korea and Taiwan due to the power politics of the Cold War era. This gave both
countries a key geopolitical significance which the rulers cleverly exploited internally
as well as in their external relations such as gaining special access to the markets of rich
countries, to foreign aid, and political-military support. Another factor to consider in
the success achieved by South Korea and Taiwan is the superior competence of their
state bureaucracy as compared to that of many Latin American countries which are
hampered by patronage, clientelism and inertia (Evans, 1998).
Before the world crisis of the 1930s the Latin American State, with few
exceptions, was of an oligarchical kind being controlled by the landed oligarchy which
ruled in coalition with merchant and mining interests. It was only after the 1930s when
governments shifted from a primary-product and export-oriented economic policy to an
inward-directed-industrialization development strategy that power shifted towards the
industrial bourgeoisie. This tended to encourage democratic forms of governance as
with the growth of the industrial working class and the middle sectors the industrial
bourgeoisie saw it in their interest to gain the support of these new social actors. But
landlords still exercised a major influence on the State and were able to block any
attempts of reform in the countryside. While the Latin American State during the ISI
period from the 1930s, and in the Central American context from the 1950s, onwards29
was a developmentalist State promoting industrialization several decades before South
Korea and Taiwan, thus giving it a head start over them, it was also a populist and
largely democratic State, while not in all countries at least in a significant number of
them. This limited the room for manoeuvre of the Latin American governments as they
were under the twin pressures from the dominant classes and the lower classes who
although less powerful formed the majority of the electorate. When in some circum-
stances enlightened policy makers and technocrats realized that certain reforms in the
countryside and changes in industrial policy were required to further the development
process they were generally thwarted in their efforts until a crisis forced changes in
policy. Usually these changes came too late, as the moment for reform had gone, and/or
were too little, as the new policy failed to bite due to the obstruction of those whose
interests were jeopardized or challenged.
It should be clear that I am not arguing that the political system in South Korea
and Taiwan was superior to Latin America's. Far from it as there is little to commend of
a system which fiercely repressed any attempt of autonomous organization and
contestation by the industrial working class and the peasantry. All I am saying is that
the Latin American State had to handle a more complex and conflictual situation. The
more repressive character of the South Korean and Taiwanese State compared to that of
several Latin American countries, does not mean that in the former case the State had
less legitimacy as compared to the latter. The regime in South Korea and Taiwan
realized that to gain legitimacy it had to share the fruits of growth more widely than
hitherto and thus adopted a more welfare-oriented and distributivist policy through
investments in education, housing, and health as well as promoting small and medium-
sized enterprises. Almost at the birth of the new State, the regime had gained important
legitimacy in the countryside through the land reform programme. During the ISI period
the populist State in Latin America embarked on similar welfare measures but at a more
reduced scale. Furthermore, they were unable to sustain these populist policies as
growth faltered and many of the social welfare gains were sacrificed with the painful
implementation of the structural adjustment programmes and the conversion to free-
market neoliberal policies during the 1980s and early 1990s.
A crucial factor for explaining the different development performance of South
Korea and Taiwan as compared to Latin America is due to what Chan (1988) refers to
as 'statecraft' or the ability of the State to design and implement strategies and policies30
conducive to development. Throughout this essay I have stressed various dimensions of
this statecraft and some will be further discussed below. I have put particular emphasis
on the State's ability to transform the land tenure system and the agrarian social
relations as well as on its ability to encourage entrepreneurship and a positive
interaction between agriculture and industry which is able to respond in a flexible
manner to changing internal and external circumstances. Latin America's deficient
statecraft as compared to South Korea' and Taiwan's is partly due to its more polarized
and entrenched class structure and paradoxically its superior natural resource
endowment.
Since colonial times the natural resource abundance already created an exploi-
tative and rentier mentality at first with the extraction of gold and silver and later with
agricultural resources. Such a rentier mentality and behaviour also spread later to
industry during the ISI period when industrialist were demanding from the State ever
increasing protectionism and subsidies. Due to the far more limited natural resource
base South Korea and Taiwan had to rely far more on their human resources and on
their statecraft to create factor endowments and comparative advantages in world
markets if they were to successfully development. Thus these East Asian countries
succeeded in graduating from a rent-seeking society during the 1950s ISI phase to an
efficiency-seeking society during the export-oriented industrialization phase thereafter
(Ranis and Orrock, 1995). While Latin America remained locked into a natural resource
'vent for surplus', these East Asian economies went first into a labour-based 'vent for
surplus' by promoting labour-intensive industrial exports (Ranis, 1990) but soon shifted
to skill-intensive industrial exports (Gereffi, 1990) and more generally to a value-added
development strategy driven by technological progress. In agriculture land was
cultivated more intensively such a double cropping and there was a shift to higher value
added crops such as vegetables and fruits while Latin America continued to rely more
on land intensive traditional crops. As for industrial development more will be said
later on.
It is through superior statecraft that South Korea and Taiwan had to rely on for
their development process if they were to overcome their natural resource constraint.
Paradoxically in the Latin American case this natural resource abundance can be a
disadvantage as it creates wealth which is either appropriated by foreigners or
strengthens the power of the dominant class which controls these natural resources. It31
might also paradoxically lead to the development of a sizeable State apparatus financed
from taxing the exploitation of the natural resources, like we have discussed in the case
of Chile, but limit its statecraft as the dominant classes use the resources of State for
their own rentier interest rather than for the wider developmental interests of the
majority of the population. The East Asian State was able to restrict the unproductive
use of capital while in Latin America the rentier mentality thrived on a staples export
base and the State was unable to limit the unproductive sources of wealth accumulation
(Legler, 1999). Thus the key developmental issue is not 'getting prices right' as argued
by the neoliberal policy makers but to get 'statecraft' right (Dietz and James, 1990).
5.2  Landlords, Peasants and Agrarian Reform Policy
Although landlords in South Korea and Taiwan were more actively contributing
to agriculture's modernization than landlords in Latin America they vanished after land
reform while this has been the exception in Latin America. Agriculture's modernization
in South Korea and Taiwan already started with Japan's colonial policy which, with the
support of landlords, forcefully promoted new crops and modern technologies among
the cultivators thereby achieving considerable increases in yields. Landlords used a
significant proportion of their rental incomes for investment purposes and for
expanding production. Thus fertilizers and chemical inputs were introduced on a wide
scale almost half a century earlier in South Korea and Taiwan than in Latin America.
More significantly, landlords in South Korea and Taiwan were not in a position to
obstruct the massive land reform process for reasons mentioned earlier. Meanwhile in
Latin America landlords were able to resist land reforms until the 1960s except in
Mexico and Bolivia which had already experienced substantial land reform by then. In
some Latin American countries no significant land reforms have been implemented
even until this day, the most glaring case being Brazil. Furthermore, in those countries
where land reforms were implemented the landlord class succeeded in limiting its
impact and in some cases even managed to revert the process as in Guatemala in the
1950s and to some extent in Chile and Nicaragua in the 1970s and 1990s respectively.
While the power of landlords was decisively broken in South Korea and Taiwan
this was not the case in Latin America with the exception of Cuba. Despite the demise
of landlordism in South Korea and Taiwan landlords were successful, thanks to efforts
by the State, in becoming capitalist entrepreneurs. They thus ceased being landlords32
using their compensation payments for making investments in industry, finance and
commerce. Landlords were thus successfully integrated into the new development
model thereby blunting their resistance to agrarian reform. Some Latin American
governments, notably in Peru and Chile, also tried to limit landlord resistance to
agrarian reform by trying to convert them into industrial or other type of entrepreneurs
by using the compensation payments for their expropriated land to invest in new
ventures. However, compensation funds were limited, lost much of their value due to
inflation and landlords were profoundly distrustful of the government which had
expropriated their estates. They thus remained hostile to the government and preferred
to undermine it instead of joining it in a national development effort. And landlords
continued to fiercely resist any agrarian reform, obstruct its implementation and even
seek its reversal. Such a situation of hostility and conflict in the Latin American
countryside was not conducive to investment and modernization.
Conflicts between landlords and peasants were more acute in Latin America as
compared to Korea and Taiwan. The history of the establishment and expansion of the
large landed estate in Latin America was based on the usurpation of indigenous lands
by force and later by economic means, often of a fraudulent kind and where political
intimidation was sometimes also present. There is also a much sharper ethnic divide in
the Latin America. Landlords invariable were the direct descendants of the Spanish and
Portuguese conquerors or of foreign, largely European, immigrants. Meanwhile the
peasantry were mainly indigenous. Thus the land conflict often acquired an ethnic
dimension giving a special edge to the class conflict between landlords and peasants in
the countryside. While Korea and Taiwan had experienced Japanese colonialism this
was more short-lived, half a century compared to Latin America's three centuries of
colonialism, and most Japanese landlords returned to Japan after the war. Thus rural
society in Korea and Taiwan was more homogenous ethnically and culturally compared
to Latin America's which greatly facilitated the implementation of land reform and the
drive to modernization in South Korea and Taiwan. In comparison to Latin America the
State in South Korea and Taiwan was also far more effective in organizing and
mobilizing the peasantry for productive purposes as well as controlling it politically
which facilitated the widespread adoption of innovations and limited disruptions (Aqua,
1974; Starvis, 1974; Ravenholt, 1981). However, this does not mean that land agitation,
strikes and revolts have been absent in South Korea and Taiwan but it does indicate that33
these East Asian governments were far more able to deal with the conflicts and
demands of the peasantry in a productive manner than was the case in Latin America
(Huizer, 1980; Moore, 1985).
While agrarian reforms in Latin America can point to some achievements on the
whole the record is poor and much of the business of agrarian reform is left unfinished.
Meanwhile South Korea's and Taiwan's land reform can be hailed as a success. The
land reform in South Korea and Taiwan resulted in proportionally more land being
expropriated and benefitting more peasants as compared to Latin America. Its impact
on growth, employment, income distribution, social integration and political stability
was also far more positive than in the Latin American case. One key reason for the
success is South Korea's and Taiwan's greater State autonomy and capacity as compared
to Latin America's State. Another reason for success can be found in the different
agrarian structure between the two regions before land reform which greatly influenced
the post-land reform structure and performance. There are, of course, exceptions to this
generalization. In this sense it is instructive to examine the case of El Salvador which is
unique within the Latin American region as its pre-reform distribution of landholdings
was relatively similar to Taiwan's but due to the other factors mentioned above, among
others, the outcome of the land reform in Taiwan was still far more successful than in
El Salvador (Pelupessy, 1999).
South Korea's and Taiwan's (as also Japan's) agrarian structure has been
characterized as unimodal compared to Latin America's bimodal (Johnston and Kilby,
1975). Peasants already before the land reform owned a greater proportion of the
country's agricultural land in South Korea and Taiwan as compared to Latin America
and after land reform became owners of almost all of it as tenants became landowners.
In South Korea and Taiwan farming was in the hands of the peasant households while
landlords were not directly involved in cultivation. Tenants were highly integrated into
the market due to the high level of commercialization, especially after the transition in
the 1920s from extensive to intensive farming. After land reform tenants gained owner-
ship but the operational size of holding changed little. Thus the distribution of lands by
tenure status was transformed but not the distribution of operational holdings. In South
Korea and Taiwan peasants were in control of production and had a long experience as
agriculturalists contrary to Latin America where the process of depeasantization was
well advanced. By the time of the agrarian reform in Latin America tenancy was limited34
as landlords through their administrative staff managed directly most of estate's land
employing wage labour. The permanent wage labourers received a money wage as well
as access to housing and a small land allotment on the estate as part of their remuner-
ation. But the land benefits were increasingly curtailed and the employment of seasonal
wage labour, which did not receive any productive fringe benefits, became more
common. Thus large scale farming dominated in Latin America and the rural labour
force had a far higher proletarian character than in South Korea and Taiwan. It is
striking to note that despite South Korea's and Taiwan's extreme high population
density as compared to Latin America landlessness practically was non-existent.
While small scale and peasant farming dominated before and after agrarian
reform in South Korea and Taiwan large scale and landlord farming dominated in Latin
America. After agrarian reform landlord farming began to loose its dominance in Latin
America due to expropriation and as some landlords converted to capitalist farming.
But large scale farming prevailed as the new land reform enterprises were transformed
into cooperatives or state farms. It was only after the break up of the reformed sector
with the parcellization process, as part of either counter-reforms or the shift to
neoliberal policies, that peasant household farming has become more widespread.
Nevertheless capitalist farming, though generally smaller in size than previous estate
farming, dominates Latin American agriculture in terms of land, capital, markets and
technology. Thus, the old latifundist dominated dualism has become a new capitalist
dualism as peasant farming, despite some gains resulting from land reform and
parcellization, continues to be marginalized and is loosing ground to capitalist farming
in the increasingly competitive and globalized character of agriculture. Nevertheless,
today's Latin American dualist agrarian structure is more complex and heterogenous
than in the pre-land reform period but peasant farming is more under stress than in the
past. Most of Latin America's shrinking rural population is today of a proletarian or
semi-proletarian nature (Kay, 2000).
In short, the unimodal type of agrarian structure and the highly egalitarian
agrarian system after land reform in South Korea and Taiwan greatly facilitated the
diffusion of the benefits of land reform and agricultural modernization to most of the
farming community (Griffin, 2000). Thus their rural economy and society is far more
inclusive and egalitarian than Latin America's and their rural development is broad
based while Latin America's continues to be exclusionary. While South Korea and35
Taiwan have largely resolved their agrarian problem this great task is still awaiting
Latin America.
5.3  Development Strategy and Agriculture-Industry Relations
As mentioned earlier most development specialists recognize that in the initial
stages of industrialization it is necessary to secure the transfer of an agriculture surplus
to industry to support the process of industrial capital accumulation. As I will argue
below to achieve a successful process of industrialization and economic development is
not just a matter of transferring resources from agriculture to industry but a judicious
development strategy entails the pursuit of appropriate policies which generate a
dynamic interaction between the two sectors (Ishikawa, 1988; Tomich, Kilby and
Johnston, 1995). According to a major study of 18 countries from Africa, Asia and
Latin America (except for Portugal) the total income transfer out of agriculture
averaged 46% of agricultural gross domestic product per year over a period of two and
half decades between 1960-85 (Schiff and Valdés, 1992). While most authors had
previously focused mainly on the more visible direct transfers Schiff and Valdés (1998)
found that indirect transfers were far more important in accounting for the transfer of
resources out of agriculture. The direct transfers arise from agricultural sectoral policies
such as agricultural price controls, export taxes or quotas and import subsidies or taxes.
They directly affect the price level of agricultural commodities relative to the price level
of the nonagricultural commodities, i.e. the domestic terms of trade. Meanwhile the
indirect transfers are less visible as they arise from outside agriculture, such as
macroeconomic policies and industrial protectionism. These indirect policies have
resulted in a real exchange rate overvaluation thereby depressing agriculture's terms of
trade.
In the view of Valdés and Schiff (1998) this direct and indirect bias against
agriculture constitutes 'the plundering of agriculture'. While this may well be the case
the authors do not consider sufficiently the inflow of resources into agriculture and fail
to discuss the impact that this transfer of an agricultural surplus has on industrial
growth and thus on a country's overall economic development. It is this dynamic
interaction which I will explore in this section. Furthermore, neoliberal authors like
Krueger, Valdés and Schiff (1991) fail to remind readers of the landlords' plundering
during the pre-ISI and agricultural-export-oriented period or the generous subsidies they36
received even during the subsequent ISI period. For example, in Argentina during the
1920s the tax on land only contributed 1% of total State's revenue and export taxes
were also insignificant. However, after Perón took power in 1946 he imposed severe
controls on food prices as well as levying higher agricultural export taxes thereby
channelling major resources from agriculture in support of a major ISI drive. His
measures were far too drastic and did indeed have a very negative impact on
agricultural production which took almost two decades to recover (Flichman, 1990). In
Brazil the State relied heavily on taxation of agricultural exports, such as coffee, which
helped to finance São Paulo's industrial infrastructure. However, agriculture's income
tax only contributed around 1% of the State's total revenue from income tax, while
receiving about 10% of the total income tax in subsidies for credit and the purchase of
fertilizers and agricultural machinery during the 1970s and early 1980s (Brandão and
Carvalho, 1991).
While for Valdés and Schiff 'plundering of agriculture' has a negative effect on
economic growth for Teranishi (1997) the key factor in accounting for a country's
superior economic performance has more to do with the net flow of resources into
agriculture, especially in support of rural infrastructure such as transport and irrigation
as well as extension services. According to Teranishi (1997) the data arising from the
World Bank study, which Schiff and Valdés have extensively used, do not show any
significant difference in the degree of transfer of resources from agriculture across the
regions. However, he finds that there are major cross-regional differences in infrastruc-
tural investment in agriculture, and that those countries with undertake larger
investments of the kind mentioned earlier have a superior economic performance.
In my view, all these analyses are limited as they fail to consider other
significant factors such as the land tenure system and class relations, which I have
analyzed previously, but above all they fail to discuss the dynamic interaction between
these various factors. In what follows I will analyze some elements of the interaction
between agriculture and industry which in my assessment have an important bearing for
explaining the superior economic performance of South Korea and Taiwan compared to
that of Latin America.
In the process of surplus creation, extraction and transfer from agriculture to
industry the State played a pivotal role in South Korea and Taiwan. It created both the
conditions for productivity growth in agriculture as well as securing the transfer of37
much of this growth to the industrial sector via such mechanisms as taxation and
manipulation of the terms of trade in favour of industry. The State, as by now is well
known, played an even more important role in the process of industrialization itself.
The State had an absolute grip over the agricultural sector, especially as the landlords
class had lost their land and political power. Although peasant farming was extended
even further after land reform the State had a key control over the peasantry through a
variety of economic, political and institutional mechanisms. The State changed class
relations and established the economic and political conditions favourable to rapid
industrialization. As landlords no longer had political power the South Korean and
Taiwanese governments could afford to ignore the demands of agriculturalists. Urban
labour did not fare much better under conditions of political unfreedom which
effectively repressed any form of industrial protest although their economic conditions
were better than those of the peasantry.
Meanwhile in Latin America even in the period of ISI, when governments were
most favourably inclined towards industrialization, the State had to make economic
concessions to landlords providing them with generous subsidies and other economic
benefits. Thus the Latin American State was unable to extract proportionally such a
high surplus from agriculture as compared to South Korea and Taiwan. Furthermore,
the populist regimes in Latin America while mainly favouring the industrialist were
unable to dictate industrial policy to them as in South Korea and Taiwan. They thus
gave in to their demands for increasing protectionism and economic benefits.
Furthermore, the populist regimes could not ignore the demands of the expanding
industrial working class which gained certain rights as well as access to some of the
benefits of the welfare State (Kaufman, 1990). The increasing inefficiency of the
industrial sector and its declining dynamism meant that the situation became
increasingly untenable for the Latin America State. The crisis of ISI and the populist
State paved the way to neoliberal economic policy in Latin America but by then Latin
America had already fallen economically well behind the Asian miracle countries. But
so far, barring notable exceptions like Chile, neoliberalism has also failed to deliver in
Latin America as the gap with South Korea and Taiwan continues to widen (Gwynne
and Kay, 1999).
While in South Korea and Taiwan the land reform allowed the State to extract
an even higher economic surplus than before the opposite was the case for Latin38
America where land reform became an economic burden. On the one hand, as peasants
became better organized in the wake of the land reform they placed greater economic
demands by requesting to be included in the provisions of the welfare state, better
access to schooling, public health, housing, and so on. On the hand, the reformed sector
failed to deliver its economic gains due to problems of mismanagement, lack of labour
discipline, divisions among members, and other problems associated with producer
cooperatives and state farms. Despite the collectivist character of many Latin American
land reforms the State was unable to control events in the countryside. While the spread
of peasant farming in South Korea and Taiwan as a result of the land reform
paradoxically strengthened State control over agriculture. The Latin American State's
close involvement in the management and economic affairs of the reformed sector in
the end weakened it while South Korea's and Taiwan's State involvement via the market
mechanism and economic policy yielded far better results.
By controlling price and trade policy and by taxation, among other measures,
governments are able to extract a large surplus from the agriculture and use it to finance
industrialization. In many countries agriculture has been an essential source of accumu-
lation for industry. In some countries the State played a key role while in others less so
as the transfers were mediated by the market or were voluntary as when, for example,
landlords decide to invest the surplus they extracted from the peasantry and rural
workers in industry, in some instances becoming industrialist themselves. It is generally
acknowledged by most scholars that in the first stages of industrialization agriculture
has made an important contribution in those countries which have successfully
developed. The situation might differ in countries which have vast mineral wealth,
receive major economic aid over a sustained period of time or which are service type
economies relying on tourism and off-shore finance to generated their sources for
industrialization and/or economic growth. But such cases tend to be rare or are more
common in small (often island economies) where agriculture does not offer much of a
future.
What is remarkable about the South Korean and Taiwanese case is that the State
managed not only to squeeze agriculture but that it did so while at the same time
ensuring agriculture's sustained growth and thus the production of a large economic
surplus. This allowed industry's spectacular expansion which in its initial stages was
financed through the peasant squeeze. Usually relations between agriculture and39
industry are viewed as conflictual and in opposition to each other. A common view is
that the gain in one sector is achieved at the expense of the other. Nevertheless there are
win-win situations as the experience of South Korea and Taiwan testifies. This was
generally not the case in Latin America as the squeeze was often less effective and often
self-defeating. During the ISI period landlords were able to limit the transfer of surplus
out of agriculture at least as far as their interest were concerned while ensuring that the
squeeze was born by the peasantry and rural workers which due to their poverty could
not be squeezed that much. A squeeze which also affected capitalist farmers was often
counter-productive as this loss of incentive resulted in a fall in agricultural output. Thus
too high a squeeze might deny agriculture the resources to create a surplus and thus in
the end there is nothing left to squeeze.
The South Korean and Taiwanese policy makers were aware that to resolve the
dilemma and achieve a win-win situation it is necessary to ensure sustained increases in
efficiency in agriculture as well as in industry. They thus had a dynamic view of the
interaction between agriculture and industry in which the institutional set up and
technological innovation were central. The governments thus ensured that the
conditions were conducive to the adoption of new technologies and stimulated shifts in
production patterns to higher value crops over the whole of the farming community
(Oshima, 1987). As for industrialization they tried to ensure via a judicious industrial
policy that the resources it transferred to industry were invested in industries which had
great potential for growth and for succeeding in export markets. In contrast to Latin
America where protectionism was similar across the board in South Korea and Taiwan
it was highly discriminatory. These Asian governments also encouraged the creation of
industries which would allow improvements in agriculture such as the chemical
fertilizer, and farm machinery and equipment industries. Furthermore, agricultural-
supporting industries received an even higher allocation of foreign aid funds than other
type of industries (Chen, 1990). Much of industrialization in Taiwan was also rural
based thereby being more attuned to the needs of the agricultural sector. Once a
successful industry is established the need for extracting a surplus from agriculture
diminishes and the flow of resources might even revert as has been the case in post-war
Japan and in recent decades in South Korea and Taiwan as well as comparative
advantages shifted from agriculture to industry (Bautista and Valdés, 1993).
The Latin American policy makers generally failed to create such a win-win40
situation. I already referred to the difficulties and constraints they faced when
attempting to reform the land tenure system and modernize agriculture. But they also
failed to discipline or control industrial capitalists and instead of ensuring their
increased competitiveness they had to yield to their pressures for increased
protectionism. The structuralist school of development thinkers who, like Prebisch and
Singer, had advocated ISI clearly did not favour the deepening of protectionism and the
drift towards an increasingly inefficient and wasteful industrial structure (Kay, 1989).
On the contrary, Prebisch (1959) was one of the first and foremost champions of
industrial exports for Latin America (and other developing countries) already in the late
1950s. But governments which tried to promote industrial exports faced internal
difficulties as protectionism was an easier option for industrialists who were
uncompetitive in the world market as well as encountering the protectionism of the rich
industrial countries in those branches of industry which were competitive inter-
nationally, such as the Brazilian shoe industry. While South Korea and Taiwan had
managed to raise the share of manufacturing exports within total exports to about a
staggering 75% in 1970, the figures for Brazil and Chile were only 10% and 4%
respectively (Ranis and Orrock, 1985). By failing to break through into industrial export
market Latin America's economic growth continued to be hampered by the foreign
exchange constraint which limited the possibilities for importing capital goods and thus
raise the country's investment rate. The key obstacle to Latin America's industrialization
was less the lack of capital but mainly the lack of foreign exchange. Thus the neglect of
agricultural exports together with the failure to shift at an earlier stage to an EOI
strategy are some of the key reasons why Latin America fell behind the East Asian
NICs.
The fact that policy makers in South Korea and Taiwan decided early on to
become competitive in international markets had the great advantage that it created an
industrial structure which took advantage of their cheap labour supply. This was a
major factor in their comparative advantage relative to the industrial countries were
labour was expensive and at the time in short supply. The transformations in South
Korea's and Taiwan's agriculture ensured that surplus labour was released to the
industrial sector thereby keeping wages low, while at the same time ensuring that
agricultural production continued to grow so as to ensure an adequate supply of food to
the industrial workers. This adequate supply of food meant that food continued to be41
cheap and thus an upward pressure on industrial wages was avoided. This in turn
allowed industrialist to reap high profits, remain competitive and use these profits to
finance industrial investment and thus sustain a high rate of industrial growth.
Furthermore, the high rate of labour absorption of South Korea's and Taiwan's
industrial sector meant that at a certain point the labour surplus was being reduced or
even eliminated and thus wages began to rise. Thus, after some time, growth did trickle
down thereby further improving equity (Kuznets, 1988).
The foundations for a more equitable income distribution were laid by the
agrarian reform. Income inequality in Taiwan, and to a lesser extent in South Korea, are
probably among the world's lowest and this has not only had positive effects on social
and political stability but provided a solid foundation for their industrialization
(Kuznets, 1988). This relatively equitable income distribution widened the size of the
domestic market for industrial commodities which is particularly important in the initial
stages of an industrialization process. Meanwhile in Latin America the limited extent of
its agrarian reform coupled with the fact that it was implemented several decades after
industrialization had started denied the region this potential widening of the internal
market and also created a distorted and inefficient industrial structure which was
limited to satisfy the particular demand profile of the higher-income groups.
Meanwhile in Latin America a large proportion of the surplus rural population
which migrated to the urban centres were unable to find industrial employment as Latin
America's industrial structure was inappropriate to the existent factor endowments of
the region. It produced commodities largely catering for the high-income groups which
required capital-intensive and foreign-exchange intensive technologies. Whereas South
Korea's and Taiwan's industrial structure was geared to the production of mass
consumer goods where greater possibilities for using labour-intensive types of
technology exist. Thus Latin America's urban surplus population continued to expand
preventing any significant trickle-down effect from economic growth and perpetuating,
if not exacerbating, income inequalities.
Similarly, increases in agricultural productivity in South Korea and Taiwan
were achieved with only limited capital requirements, such as greater use of fertilizers
and improved seeds. Meanwhile, changes in agricultural productivity in Latin America
were more demanding on the scarce capital resources and often also required more
foreign exchange. This is due to the fact that it was mainly the large-scale commercial42
farm sectors which invested in technological innovations and were thus of a mechanical
kind requiring the importation of tractors, harvest-combines and other machinery. Thus
Latin America's bimodal agrarian structure and the State's bias policy towards large
scale farming determined a partially inappropriate pattern of technological change in
agriculture and one which was not widely diffused among farmers as it was confined to
capitalist farmers. This retarded and limited the spread of innovations in Latin
America's agriculture. In Latin America governments also tended to allocate much of
their (rather limited) rural expenditures directly to landlords. By contrast in South
Korea and Taiwan the State disbursed its rural expenditure in a far more egalitarian
manner which was far more conducive to the widespread adoption of new technologies
and distribution of the benefits of this expenditure as it was used to finance rural
infrastructure, such as irrigation and roads, to which many more people have access to
(Aoki, Murdoch and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997).
Latin America fell behind the East Asian NICs not only because it neglected
agriculture but also because it failed to shift in time from an ISI to an EOI development
strategy. After the exhaustion of the easy or primary phase of ISI based on the
consumer-goods industry during the 1960s some Latin American countries managed to
raise their savings rate due to the higher capital accumulation requirements for
financing the investment in the intermediate-goods and above all in the capital-goods
industrial sector (Anglade and Fortín, 1990). A similar process happened in South
Korea and Taiwan with the difference that both countries were able to continue with, as
well as deepen, this shift to a more capital-intensive, labour-skill-intensive, foreign-
exchange-intensive and large-scale industrialization process while Latin America was
unable to do so (Gore, 1996). Latin America instead of using the abundance of petro-
dollars available since 1973 in international financial markets for shifting decisively to
an EOI strategy (only Brazil and Mexico did some half-hearted attempts) engaged in a
consumption binge, capital flight and became further entrenched in the ISI model. The
chickens came home to roost with the 1980s debt crisis which has been appropriately
named the 'lost decade' for development. Meanwhile the East Asian countries were not
only able to continue to mobilise domestic savings, although South Korea also began to
borrow more capital from abroad, but they were also able to overcome the twin
problems which had blocked Latin America's industrialization, i.e. the foreign exchange
and market constraints.43
By moving already during the consumer-goods industrial stage into exports the
East Asian countries were able to earn the additional foreign exchange necessary to
finance the imports of intermediate- and capital-goods required for the next stage in the
industrialization process. They also gained valuable experience in international markets
and by being exposed to a greater extent than the Latin American economies to world
competition had a powerful incentive to become more efficient and hence competitive
(Balassa, 1989). By having shifted also to an EOI strategy they were able to access a
much wider market thereby being able to reap the benefits of economies of scale which
are particular important in the manufacturing of products such as cars, ships, steel,
chemicals, and electronics, most of which South Korea and Taiwan started to produce.
The comprehensive and inclusionary educational system of South Korea and Taiwan
also ensured the necessary supply of skilled labour required for some of these industries
whose wages were still relatively  low  compared  to  the developed  countries  as well 
as  to  Latin America (Teranishi, 1997).
In my view, even before the 1980s debt crisis which had such a savage impact
on the Latin American economies, Latin America had fallen behind the East Asia NICs.
It should not be forgotten that Latin America started to industrialize over half a century
before the East Asian NICs. Latin America's biggest failure was not to have shifted as
quickly and swiftly as South Korea and Taiwan from primary ISI, to secondary ISI, to
primary EOI and secondary EOI (Gereffi, 1990). Most Latin American countries have
even today not yet reached the secondary EOI stage which includes higher value-added
and skill-intensive industries. Latin America should have shifted to an EOI strategy
already in the 1950s even before the East Asian NICs. It missed an historic opportunity
to do so which South Korea and Taiwan exploited to the full, whether by chance or
design is still debatable (Cheng, 1990). However, events unfolded as they did in Latin
America and perhaps the historic option was not available to it due to the various
structural constraints, among them the unresolved agrarian question, that I have
discussed in this essay.
6. CONCLUSIONS
As discussed in this essay, the particular agrarian and industrial structure, the
nature of technological change, the pattern of structural change, and the intersectoral
resource flows are major determinants of a country's rate of growth. Partly due to44
different initial conditions and more importantly due to different policy choices South
Korea and Taiwan were able to create their miracle. Meanwhile Latin America failed to
live up to its potential as within a few decades it lost its initial advantage over the East
Asian NICs having started its industrialization almost half a century earlier.
Agriculture can and needs to make a contribution to industrial development,
especially in its initial phase, as industrialization in turn can stimulate agriculture by
providing key productivity enhancing inputs for it as well as a market for its output. But
agriculture should not be squeezed to such an extent that farmers no longer have the
resources nor the incentives to invest and expand production. The advantage of peasant
farming, as shown in South Korea and Taiwan, is that it has a great capacity for self-
exploitation. The incentive threshold is low as peasant farmers require few economic
incentives for expanding production while latifundist, and even capitalist, farming in
Latin America required major and very costly incentives for achieving the same results.
Despite the heavy net outflow of resources from agriculture Taiwan's and South Korea's
government policy was able to raise agricultural productivity sufficiently rapidly to
leave some economic incentives to peasant farmers to expand production. At the same
time it is important for the achievement of sustained growth that the resources
transferred from agriculture to industry are effectively used in developing an
appropriate industrial structure. Industrial productivity needs to be increased so as to be
able to finance capital accumulation and the eventually rising wages as the labour
surplus provided by agriculture gets exhausted (Myint, 1990). Therefore, the critical
factor for securing continuous growth is the achievement of greater productivity in
resource use throughout the economy rather than the transfer of resources from one
sector to another. This does not mean that such transfers might not be important at
certain stages of the development process or that they should always go in one
direction. What is vital is that whatever transfers are made in whatever direction they
should maximize productivity growth throughout the economy.
Which are the key factors which explain the difference in performance between
the Asian NICs and Latin America? In this essay I have focused on three key factors
although others may be identified as well. First, South Korea's and Taiwan's superior
State capacity and policy performance. Second, Latin America's failure to create an
agrarian structure more conducive to growth with equity. Third, South Korea's and
Taiwan's greater ability to design an appropriate industrial policy as well as to bring45
about a more positive interaction between agriculture and industry. While Latin
America got off to an early start with industrialization it was unable to overcome
quickly enough the limitations of ISI and shift to a more export-oriented and
competitive industrial structure (Jenkins, 1991b). While geopolitical factors were more
favourable to South Korea and Taiwan, natural resource endowments were more
favourable to Latin America. All the three factors which I have identified are closely
interconnected. South Korea's and Taiwan's good fortune was that they managed to
develop the positive linkages between them while in Latin America these factors were
often in conflict with each other and even within itself. While the Asian NICs
succeeded in creating a virtuous and mutually reinforcing upwardly moving spiral
between these factors the Latin American countries failed to do so.
Miracles are though not eternal and the Asian NICs have revealed certain
weaknesses and limitations as the financial crisis in the late 1990s has shown (Edwards,
2000). Thus miracles can turn into frustrations. Whether frustrations can turn into
miracles remains to be seen but history has shown that frustrations do not need to be
enduring. However, so long as the vast disparities in economic and political power, as
well as in class relations, remain development will continue to be an uneven process
globally, nationally and locally as the benefits of development will continue to be
captured by a minority.
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